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]. RODNEY JOHNSON 
The Uniform Disposition of Community Property 
Rights at Death Act: Virginia in 1979? 
T HE presence of community property in the estate of a Virginia domiciliary poses a series of prob-
lems that are being faced with increasing regularity 
by a growing number of Virginia attorneys. While 
Virginia has always followed the common-law system 
of property ownership, Virginia also adheres to the 
general rule that " (a) change of domicile from a state 
where the community property prevails to a common-
law state does not affect the community character of 
property previously acquired".1 Thus, although Vir-
ginia's common-law system of property ownership 
will govern the property rights of married persons 
who have moved from a community property state to 
Virginia insofar as their future property is concerned, 
the laws of the state where the married persons were 
domiciled at the time any community property was 
acquired will continue to control their vested rights in 
this community property as well as their rights in any 
after acquired property that is purchased with the 
proceeds of or income from this community property. 
The Magnitude of the Problem 
A rough idea of the magnitude of this problem of 
"transplanted" community property in Virginia and 
the other common-law states can be derived from a 
comparison of the great number of Americans who 
live in the community-property states with the statis-
tics relating to the mobility of the American people. 
According to the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, the eight community-property states of Ari-
zona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Texas and Washington contain 21.5% of 
the Population of the United States-a total of 
46,339,000 individuals.2 According to this same 
source, approximately four to five million persons 
moved from these community-property states to other 
states during the five-year period 1970-75.3 How 
1 Commonwealth v. Terjen, 197 Va. 596, at 597, 90 S.E.2d 
801 (1956). 
. 
2 Table No. 10 Population-States: 1960 to 1976, and 
Table No. 2 Population: 1900 to 1977, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
3 Table No. 46 Mobility Status of the Population: 1970-
1975, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 
EDITOR'S NoTE: Professor Johnson and Thomas S. Word, 
Jr., Esquire, are the Virginia members of the Committee on 
Property Problems of the Migrant Client that was created by 
the American Bar Association's Section on Real Property, 
Probate and Trust Law. 
many of these four to five million persons might have 
moved to Virginia during this five-year period is of 
course quite speculative. It would be even more specu-
lative to attempt an estimate of the total number of 
persons currently domiciled in Virginia who were 
domiciled in a community-property state at any time 
in the past. However, it can reasonably be assumed 
that there are a number of such persons, and it is a 
matter of non-debatable law that " ... their change 
of domicile ... (did) not affect the community char-
acter of property previously acquired" 4 by them and 
brought into Virginia. 
The Problem Illustrated 
The presence of this "transplanted" community 
property in Virginia can raise a variety of problems 
during the lifetimes of the persons owning such prop-
erty and this kind of property is almost guaranteed to 
cause problems when one of them dies. Let us assume, 
for example, the following hypothetical for purposes 
of illustrating some of these problems as well as the 
suggested legislative response to them. John and Mary 
Deaux moved to Virginia some five years ago from 
one of the community-property states, where they were 
domiciled during the first twelve years of their married 
life. John has been employed during the entirety of this 
seventeen year period with Sears and Roebuck, starting 
off in the stockroom and now the manager of the ap-
pliance department in Hometown, Virginia. Mary has 
remained at home during the entirety of their married 
life and has spent all of her time raising children and 
keeping house. Under these facts Mary, the "non-
acquiring spouse," would be recognized as having a 
present, equal interest in all of the income earned 
(and assets purchased therewith) by John, the "ac-
4 Commonwealth v. Terjen, supra note 1. 
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quiring spouse," during the twelve years they lived in 
the community property state even though John may 
have taken "title" to the assets so acquired in his sole 
name. Any property owned by either John or Mary 
prior to the marriage or acquired during the mar-
riage by gift or inheritance would be classified as 
"separate" property in which the other spouse would 
have no rights. John and Mary have been reading a 
financial planning series in Local Newspaper which 
has prompted them to contact Local Lawyer about 
the prepartion of a "simple" will for them. First of all, 
if neither John nor Mary mentions that some of their 
assets were accumulated while they were domiciled 
in a community-property state, what is Local Lawyer's 
duty in regard to questioning them about past domi-
ciles in order to a<scertain the possible existence of 
"tainted" property? Is it malpractice if he doesn't? Let 
us assume that John and Mary reveal this information 
to Local Lawyer and also inform him that they under-
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stand their rights in connection with the community 
property they brought into Virginia five years ago 
but, they ask, "How will our various community-
property assets, common-law assets, and mixed assets 
be identified when we die, what are our dispositive 
rights in regard to our combined estate, and is there 
anything we can do now to eliminate any confusion 
and uncertainty when we die?" Let us assume that 
John dies and Local Ba:nk qualifies as personal rep-
resentative on his estate. In the course of its adminis-
tration, Local Bank discovers that John and Mary 
lived in a community property state for twelve years. 
Does Local Bank have a fiduciary duty to search out 
and discover any possible community property or 
assets into which community property can be traced? 
Let us assume that John devises the ever popular 
Blackacre to his brother, Bob, who wishes to sell 
Blackacre to the adjoining landowner, Harry. Con-
summation of the sale is delayed until one year has 
passed from the time of John's death, at the title 
company's request, in order to protect Harry from the 
possibility of a claim under an after-discovered will. 
Three days after the sale is consummated, Mary 
brings an action against Harry in which she alleges 
that Blackacre was purchased with the proceeds re-
alized upon the sale of community-property assets 
shortly after she and John came to Virginia. There-
fore, she alleges, Blackacre was community property 
at John's death and, although "title" thereto was 
taken in John's name alone, John's will devising 
Blackacre to Bob only passed John's undivided one-
half interest to Bob in fact and thus she a:nd Harry 
are now equal tenants in common of Blackacre. How 
does Harry's lawyer respond? How doe5 the lawyer 
for Local Bank, that supplied Harry's financing and 
took back a purchase-money deed of trust on Black-
acre as security for the funds advanced, respond to 
this attack on its security? How do the lawyers for the 
title insurance company that insured Harry's fee sim-
ple title respond if a claim is filed against them? This 
listing of hypothetical possibilities could continue on 
but it is believed that case has been made, at this 
point, for the proposition advanced in the opening 
sentence that the presence of community property in 
the estate of a Virginian poses a series of problems 
that arc being faced with increasrng regularity by a 
growing number of Virginia lawyers. 
A Partial Solution to the Problem 
This series of problems is exacerbated by a complete 
lack of answers or even guiding authority in Virginia. 
There are no statutes and only one case5 dealing with 
such "transplanted" community property. Of course 
Virginia is not alone in suffering these problems asso-
ciated with "transplanted" community property or in 
having little or no authority for their resolution. In 
recognition of the widespread nature and importance 
of these problems, the American Bar Association's 
Section on Real Property, Probate and Trust Law 
created the Committee on Property Problems of 
the Migrant Client approximately eleven years ago to 
study these problems and report accordingly. This 
committee's study led it to the formation of a four-
year association with the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws which resulted 
in the promulgation by the NCCUSL of the Uniform 
Disposition of Community Property Rights at Death 
Act in April, 1971. The Act was approved by the 
American Bar Association in February, 1972.6 The 
primary purpose of the Act is "to preserve the rights 
of each spouse in property which was community 
property prior to change of domicile, as well as in 
property substituted therefor where the spouses have 
not indicated an intention to sever or alter their 
'community' rights." 7 While this primary purpose 
has already been accomplished by the Virginia-
Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Ter-
jen, the adoption of the Act would be quite beneficial 
in Virginia because it would provide a number of 
answers, guidelines, and presumptions to help resolve 
the practical problems that are encountered in ad-
ministering such property. 
What the Act Does Not Do 
Prior to a section by section discussion of the Act, 
it might be helpful to note at the outset what the Act 
"Commonwealth v. Terjen, supra note 1. This case has 
been the subject of comment on three occasions and each 
writer has concluded that the court erred in its interpretation 
of the nature of the rights of married persons under Cali-
fornia's community-property system. See De Funiak, Com-
monwealth v. Terjen; Common Law Mutilates Community 
Property, 43 Va. L. Rev. 49 (1957); Moore, Community 
Property Problems for the Common Law Lawyer, Estate 
Planning in Depth Resource Materials, Vol. 1, p. 625, at 
642, ALI/ ABA ( 1977); and Recent Decision, 42 Va. L. Rev. 
724 (1956). 
6 A more complete treatment of the origin and work of the 
Committee on Property Problems of the Migrant Client, as 
well as a discussion of the need for the Uniform Act, will be 
found in McClanahan, Property Problems of the Migrant 
Client-A Statutory Solution, 111 Trusts & Estates 950 
( 1972). Mr. McClanahan is Chairman of the Committee. 
7 Prefactory Note, page 3, Uniform Disposition of Com-
munity Property Rights at Death Act. 
does NOT do. First-The Act does not attempt to 
deal with any of the problems that may arise during 
the lifetime of John and Mary in connection with 
their "transplanted" community property. These life-
time problems are thought to be not only of less im-
portance but also of much greater difficulty to deal 
with in the context of a Uniform Act and thus they 
are not treated. Second-The Act has no effect on the 
rights of lifetime creditors of John or Mary as they 
present their claims during the post-death period. 
Third-The Act does not enlarge the rights of a 
surviving spouse in the "transplanted" community 
property beyond what they would have been under 
the laws of the community property state where the 
property in question was originally acquired. Fourth 
-The Act has no effect on property acquired by 
John and Mary after they become Virginia domi-
ciliaries (except as such property is acquired with the 
proceeds of or profits from community property). 
Fifth-The Act does not prevent John and Mary 
from severing the community property nature of their 
previously acquired property and casting ownership 
of such prnperty in whatever alternate form they 
may desire during their joint lives. As a matter of 
fact, the Act would provide a legislative sanction of 
such severance which, in tum, would cause the "com-
munity" character of the property in question (and 
its attendant problems) to cease to exist and the Act, 
then, to be no longer applicable. 
UNIFORM DISPOSITION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
RIGHTS AT DEATH AcT 
SECTION 1. [Application.] This Act ap-
plies to the disposition at death of the follow-
ing property acquired by a married person: 
( 1) all personal property, wherever 
situated: 
( i) which was acquired as or be-
came, and remained, community prop-
erty under the laws of another juris-
diction; or, 
(ii) all or the proportionate part 
of that property acquired with the 
rents, issues, or income of or the pro-
ceeds from, or in exchange for, that 
community property; or 
(iii) traceable to that community 
property; 
( 2) all or the proportionate part of 
any real property situated in this 
state which was acquired with the 
rents, issues or income of the proceeds 
from or in exchange for, property ac-
quired as or which became, and re-
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mained, community property under the 
laws of another jurisdiction, or prop-
erty traceable to that community prop-
erty. 
The purpose of Section 1 is to define the property 
that is subject to the Act. In recognition of the gen-
eral principle that the law of a decedent's domicile 
controls the disposition of his personal property, re-
gardless of where it may be situated, while the law of 
the state where a decedent's real property is located 
determines the disposition of such property on the 
death of its owner. Section 1 of the Act is divided 
into two subsections which provide separate, though 
similar, rules for personal property and real property. 
Both subsections are controlled by the same policy 
considerations; viz., whatever property (a) was ac-
quired as community property, or ( b) though not 
so acquired, became community property by agree-
ment of the parties while domiciled in a community 
property state, or ( c) was acquired with the income 
from community property, or ( d) is property trace-
able to a community property source, is "property 
subject to the Act" unless the spouses have agreed to 
the contrary. While both of the subsections would 
also require an apportionment of property where a 
part of the consideration therefor is community prop-
erty and the other part of the consideration is sep-
arate property, the Act is content to stop at this 
statement of policy and leave it to the courts in the 
enacting states to determine what the "proportionate 
part" should be. This is believed to be a sound 
approach because of the large number of differing 
factual patterns that can be expected to arise in the 
future and the variety of rules that have been devel-
oped already in an attempt to do equity under these 
differing circumstances.8 
SECTION 2. [ Rebuttable Presumptions. J 
In ~etermining whether this Act applies to 
specific property the following rebuttable 
presumptions apply: 
. ( 1) property acquired during mar-
nage by a spouse of that marriage while 
domiciled in a jurisdiction under whose 
laws property could then be acquired as 
community property is presumed to have 
been acquired as or to have become 
and remained, property to which this Ac~ 
applies; and 
( 2) real property situated in this State 
and personal property wherever situated 
----
8 Moore, op. cit. note 5, supra, at page 631. 
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acquired by a married person while domi-
ciled in a jurisdiction under whose laws 
property could not then be acquired as 
community property, title to which was 
taken in a form which created rights of 
survivorship, is presumed not to be prop-
erty to which this Act applies. 
Section 2 c.ontains several rebuttable presumptions 
that are designed to facilitate the application of the 
definitions contained in Section 1 and to aid the 
court in determining what property in a decedent's 
estate is property subject to the Act. Subsection ( 1) 
presumes that all property in John's estate which 
was acquired while John and Mary were domiciled 
in a community property state is in fact community 
property. Subsection ( 2) presumes that all Virginia 
realty and all personal property wherever located 
that was acquired by John while a domiciliary of 
Virginia is not property subject to the act if title to 
the property in question was taken in the names of 
John and Mary with survivorship. It will be obvious 
to the most casual reader that there are many situa-
tions for which no presumptions have been provided. 
The official comments caution us, however, that "no 
negative implications were intended to be raised by 
lack of inclusion of other presumptions in Section 2; 
areas not covered were simply left to the normal 
process of ascertainment of rights in property." 9 
SECTION 3. [ Dispostion upon Death. J 
Upon death of a married person, one-half 
of the property to which this Act applies is 
the property of the surviving spouse and is 
not subject to testamentary disposition by 
the decedent or distribution under the laws 
of succession of this State. One-half of that 
property is the property of the decedent and 
is subject to testamentary disposition or dis-
tribution under the laws of succession of this 
State. With respect to property to which this 
Ac~ ai:plies, the one-half of the property 
which is the property of the decedent is not 
subject to the surviving spouse's right to 
elect against the will [and no estate of 
dower or curtesy exists in the property of 
the decedent. J 
Section 3 provides that upon the death of John 
one-half of the property to which the Act applies 
belongs to Mary. If John dies testate the other one-
half of the property will go to the beneficiaries named 
in his will, free from any claims on the part of Mary 
9 Prefactory Note, page 4, Uniform Disposition of Com-
munity Property Rights at Death Act. 
to dower in the realty or a statutory forced share 
of the personalty. If John should die intestate, his 
one-half will be disposed of according to the statutes 
of descent and distribution free from any claim of 
dower on the part of Mary. It should be noted, how-
ever, that under Virginia intestate succession law, if 
John should die without children or descendants of 
deceased children surviving him, Mary will be John's 
heir 'and distributee and thus will succeed to his one-
half; and, even if John is survived by children or 
descendants of deceased children, Mary will still suc-
ceed to Y:J of John's personal property as distributee. 
SECTION 4. [Perfection of Title of Sur-
viving Spouse.] If the title to any property 
to which this Act applies was held by the 
decedent at the time of death, title of the 
surviving spouse may be perfected by an 
order of the [court] or by execution of an 
instrument by the personal representative of 
the heirs or devisees of the decedent with the 
approval of the [court] . Neither the per-
sonal representative nor the court in which 
the decedent's estate is being administered 
has a duty to discover or attempt to dis-
cover whether property held by the dece-
dent is property to which this Act applies, 
unless a written demand is made by the sur-
viving spouse or the spouse's successor in 
interest. 
Section 4 provides that if any of the property titled 
in John's name at the time of his death is property 
subject to the act, Mary's title thereto may be per-
fected by court order or by deed from John's personal 
representative or successors in interest with the ap-
proval of the court.10 Most importantly, however, 
from a fiduciary administration standpoint, this sec-
tion also provides that John's personal representative 
has no duty to discover or attempt to discover if any 
of the property titled in John's name at the time of 
his death is property subject to the Act, unless 
Mary makes a written demand upon the personal 
representative. 
SECTION 5. [Perfection of Title of Per-
sonal Representative, Heir or Devisee.] If 
the title to any property to which this Act 
applies is held by the surviving spouse at the 
time of the decedent's death, the personal 
representative or an heir or devisee of the 
10 It may be preferable to change the reference to "court" 
at this point to "commissioner of accounts" in order to con-
form Section 4 to Virginia probate procedure and to provide 
for maximum flexibility. 
decedent may institute an action to perfect 
title to the property. The personal repre-
sentative has no fiduciary duty to discover or 
attempt to discover whether any property 
held by the surviving spouse is property to 
which this Act applies, unless a written de-
mand is made by an heir, devisee, or credi-
tor of the decedent. 
Section 5, which is a corollary to Section 4, deals 
with property that is in Mary's name at John's death 
and provides that John's personal representative or 
successors in interest may bring an action to perfect 
their title to any such property that is property sub-
ject to the Act. Again it is provided that John's 
personal representative has no duty to discover or 
attempt to discover whether any of the property so 
titled in Mary's name is property subject to the Act 
unless one of John's creditors or successors in inter-
est makes a written demand upon the personal 
represen ta ti ve. 
SECTION 6. [Purchaser for Value or 
Lender.] 
(a) If a surviving spouse has apparent 
title to property to which this Act applies, a 
purchaser for value or a lender taking a se-
curity interest in the property takes his in-
terest in the property free of any rights of 
the personal representative or an heir or de-
visee of the decedent. 
( b) If a personal representative or an 
heir or devisee of the decedent has apparent 
title to property to which this Act applies, 
a purchaser for value or a lender taking a 
security interest in the property takes his in-
terest in the property free of any rights of 
the surviving spouse. 
( c) A purchaser for value or a lender 
need not inquire whether a vendor or bor-
rower acted properly. 
( d) The proceeds of a sale or creation of 
a security interest shall be treated in the 
same manner as the property transferred to 
the purchaser for value or a lender. 
Section 6, which is rather clearly designed to pro-
tect post-death purchasers for value and lenders, does 
so by focusing on apparent title at the time of the 
transaction in question. Thus if John held title to any 
property subject to the Act at the time of his death, 
John's devisee can transfer a perfect title to a pur-
chaser for value even though Mary has placed. the 
purchaser on notice of her claim to an interest 
therein. Similarly, if paper title to such property is in 
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Mary at the time of John's death, Mary has the 
power to transfer a perfect title to a purchaser for 
value even though such purchaser has notice of the 
estate's claim to an interest therein. The comments 
to this section emphasize that value is the only re-
quirement for the purchaser to be fully protected. 
This "immunity" of a purchaser for value is also 
extended to a lender who takes a security interest in 
property subject to the Act from a surviving spouse 
or successor in interest who has apparent title. The 
drafters point out that this approach (a) will permit 
reliance on apparent title, (b) will facilitate deter-
mination of title and disposition of property where 
adequate consideration is paid, and ( c) will merely 
continue the inter vivas rule that a spouse with ap-
parent title may transfer perfect title to community 
property to a third party who gives value therefor. 
While this section intends to facilitate the transfer 
of property by protecting the rights of a purchaser 
for value or a lender, it is not intended to affect the 
rights of Mary and John's successors in interest 
among themselves. Thus the section provides that 
where such a sale cuts off the rights of these parties 
to particular property, the proceeds of the sale shall 
stand in the place of the property sold and be subject 
to their claims accordingly. 
SECTION 7. [Creditor's Rights.] This Act 
does not affect rights of creditors with re-
spect to property to which this Act applies. 
Section 7 is self-explanatory. 
SECTION 8. [Acts of Married Persons. J 
This Act does not prevent married persons 
from severing or altering their interests in 
property to which this Act applies. 
Section 8 may be the most important section of the 
Act for estate planning purposes because it recognizes 
the right of John and Mary to sever the community 
nature of their "tainted" property and create any 
different form of ownership that would have been 
permitted by the laws of the state where they were 
domiciled when they originally acquired the prop-
erty. There is presently a lack of complete agreement 
among Virginia lawyers concerning the ability of 
married persons to deal with each other in regard to 
their rights in each other's property. Thus this section 
should prove particularly helpful to estate planners 
because of its recognition of the rights of married 
Virginians to deal with each other in regard to their 
"tainted" property which represents the most trouble-
some category. 
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SECTION 9. [Limitations on T estamen-
tary Disposition.] This Act does not author-
ize a person to dispose of property by will 
if it is held under limitations imposed by 
law preventing testamentary disposition by 
that person. 
Section 9 provides that the Act does not enlarge 
John's or Mary's dispositive rights in the "trans-
planted" community property beyond what they 
would have been under the laws of the community 
property state where the property in question was 
originally acquired. 
SECTION 10. [Uniformity of Application 
and Construction. J This Act shall be so ap-
plied and construed as to effectuate its gen-
eral purpose to make uniform the law with 
respect to the subject of this Act among 
those states which enact it. 
SECTION 11. [Short Title.] This Act may 
be cited as the Uniform Disposition of Com-
munity Property Rights at Death Act. 
SECTION 12. [Repeal and Effective 
Date. J The following acts and laws are re-
pealed as of the effective date of this Act: 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
Passage of the Act would not require the repeal 
of any statutes. 
SECTION 13. [Time of Taking Effect.] This 
Act shall take effect. ... 
It is anticipated that the Act will be introduced 
into the 1979 Session of the General Assembly. 
Conclusion 
It is believed that the Act represents a desirable 
addition to Virginia law because it provides valuable 
assistance through its definitions, rules, presumptions, 
and guidelines (a) to help insure the preservation 
of married persons' rights in "transplanted" com-
munity property, and (b) to enable Virginia law-
yers, fiduciaries, lenders, and title companies to more 
effectively perform their roles vis-a-vis such property. 
Moreover, in addition to minimizing future litigation 
and facilitating the planning and administration of 
estates that consist in part of "transplanted" com-
munity property, adoption of the Act in Virginia 
would achieve a desirable uniformity of treatment of 
this area of the law with our sister states. 
